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The ability to attribute intentions to others is a hallmark
of human social cognition but is altered in paranoia.
Paranoia is the most common positive symptom of psychosis
but is also present to varying degrees in the general
population. Epidemiological models suggest that psychosis
risk is associated with low social rank and minority status, but
the causal effects of status and group affiliation on paranoid
thinking remain unclear. We examined whether relative social
status and perceived group affiliation, respectively, affect live
paranoid thinking using two large-N (N= 2030), pre-registered
experiments. Interacting with someone from a higher social
rank or a political out-group led to an increase in paranoid
attributions of harmful intent for ambiguous actions. Pre-
existing paranoia predicted a general increase in harmful intent
attribution, but there was no interaction with either type
of social threat: highly paranoid people showed the same
magnitude of increase as non-paranoid people, although from
a higher baseline. We conclude social threat in the form of low
social status and out-group status affects paranoid attributions,
but ongoing paranoia represents a lowered threshold for
detecting social threat rather than an impaired reactivity
to it.
1. Introduction
Social threat detection mechanisms should be sensitive to the
harms that can be imposed by conspecifics, including aggressive
attacks, ostracism, social exclusion, reputation damage and other
forms of harm that have potential negative consequences for
reproductive success and/or survival. Nevertheless, humans
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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show striking variation in the tendency to attribute harmful intent to others and this is present as a
continuum in the population, varying in accuracy and ranging in content from increased socio-evaluative
concerns to frank paranoid delusions [1–3]. Here, we distinguish between paranoid attributions (the
attribution of harmful intent, which may or may not be accurate), paranoid ideation (the extent of
paranoid thinking, which may include accurate attributions of intent but which is known to increasingly
correlate with over-estimate of social threat as intensity increases [4]) and paranoid delusions, where
delusions have a clear persecutory theme. Clearly, paranoia is an important social and clinical concern,
although the causal factors underpinning variation in paranoid ideation are still not fully understood.
Both genetic and environmental components contribute to paranoia [5,6]. Research on environmental
predictors has consistently implicated adverse social conditions in promoting paranoid thinking,
with those at the bottom of the social ladder being most affected. Paranoia is more common
in people with low socioeconomic status, including those who live in poverty [7,8]. Social
adversity also manifests in terms of discrimination and exclusion, and people from minority
ethnic backgrounds report higher levels of paranoia [9], an effect which is ameliorated as ethnic
density increases [10]. Additionally, perceived discrimination is associated with paranoia in ‘ultra-
high risk for psychosis’ individuals [11] and mediates the association between deprivation and
paranoia [12]. Increasing evidence also suggests that the subjective perception of one’s relative
status in the world is also an important predictor of paranoia. For example, a lower perceived
social rank compared to others predicts paranoid ideation [13] and psychosis-proneness [14]. In
addition, low subjective social rank mediates the effect of childhood deprivation on later paranoid
thinking [15].
Collectively, these findings suggest that interacting with partners who have a higher social rank or are
from a social out-group will increase concerns about personal harm and these effects will be exaggerated
among people who have higher levels of pre-existing paranoia. However, results from epidemiological
studies are correlative and cannot establish causal effects. Despite the obvious need for experimental
work in this area, very few (if any) studies have addressed the causal factors that drive paranoia in
genuine social interactions with others. Freeman et al. [16] used a virtual reality task to induce negative
social comparisons by manipulating height—a common marker for social rank [17]—leading to increased
paranoia when participants interacted with taller virtual avatars. However, a more recent study where
participants were asked to compare themselves with profiles of high and low status people found a
clear impact on perceived social rank but no effect on paranoid ideation [18]. Although experimentally
innovative, both studies used simulated social situations, potentially limiting their ability to engage the
most relevant social cognitive processes that help us manage competition and cooperation with others
in genuine social interactions [19,20].
Paradigms from game theory can be used to examine social decision-making and perception
in genuine social interactions [21], and these approaches are now increasingly being used in
psychiatry research [22–26]. For example, Raihani & Bell [26,27] have used the Dictator Game to
explore how pre-existing paranoia affects social cognition and behaviour. The Dictator Game is
a two-player game, where one individual (the ‘dictator’) decides how to split an endowment of
real money that the partner (the ‘receiver’) must accept [28]. This task is useful for identifying
paranoid attributions because the motives underpinning dictator decisions in the task are ambiguous:
selfish dictators might be motivated to earn more money for themselves (self-interest) or by a
desire to deny the partner of any money (harmful intent). This paradigm allows a measure of the
tendency to infer harmful intent during a social interaction in which the participant is directly
involved.
The Dictator Game also lends itself to testing the effects of social threat on paranoid attributions.
We do this here, using two pre-registered studies asking whether (i) interacting with people
from similar or differing social ranks and (ii) interacting with in-group or out-group individuals,
respectively, affect paranoid attributions. Previous work indicates that paranoia positively predicts
harmful intent attribution but not attribution of self-interest in this game [26]. We expected to
replicate this effect, and additionally to show that attribution of harmful intent is greater in
socially threatening scenarios, specifically when interacting with someone of a higher social rank
and when interacting with an out-group partner (respectively). We also expected that pre-existing
paranoia would exacerbate the response to social threat, such that highly paranoid people would
show dysregulated responses to social threat. In other words, we anticipated we would detect
an interaction between paranoia and experimental social threat in the strength of harmful intent
attributions.
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2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Data were collected in June 2017. This project was approved by the UCL Ethics board (project 3720/001).
Participation was voluntary and informed consent was obtained. We recruited 2030 (1175 female, 851
male, 4 unknown; age: range 18–98, mean: 35.9± 0.27) US-based participants via Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk, http://www.mturk.com).
2.2. Procedure
Part A. Participants were paid $0.50 for Part A. Initially, participants completed the Green et al.
Paranoid Thought Scales (GPTS) [29], a 32-item scale that captures pre-existing paranoid ideation
across the full clinical and non-clinical spectrum. Then, participants (i) rated their subjective social
status using the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status [30] and (ii) rated their political affiliation
on a slider scale of 0–100 (initialized at 50) where 0= liberal and 100= conservative (see electronic
supplementary material for materials). The MacArthur Scale provides a valid and reliable rating of
subjective social status that shows the expected relationship to objective social status indicators [31]
and health outcomes [32]. Subjective ratings of political affiliation are externally valid and strongly
predict group identification and voting behaviour [33]. Moreover, political affiliation is a particularly
salient type of group affiliation and is associated with differences in identity, social norms and values
[34] and predicts divergent in- and out-group preferences and inter-group behaviours in experimental
studies [35].
Part B. We allowed a minimum interval of 10 days before recalling participants to take part in
one of the two experimental tasks (hereafter, the ‘social status task’ and the ‘political affiliation task’,
respectively). Inevitably, we experienced some attrition with this method and not all of the participants
from Part A were re-recruited. Of the 2030 participants recruited to Part A, we successfully re-recruited
1242 to the social status task and 1308 to the political affiliation task. In each task, participants were paid
a show-up fee of $0.20 and could earn $0.25–$0.75 depending on the decisions made by them and by
their partner. All participants from Part A were invited to take part in both experimental tasks in Part B
(minimum interval of 9 days between tasks, task order counter-balanced).
In both tasks, participants were cast in the role of receiver in a Dictator Game. In the social status
task, participants were reminded that they had previously indicated their subjective social status on the
MacArthur Scale, and were then allocated to one of the three conditions where they were informed that
the dictator was of either (i) higher, (ii) lower or (iii) equal social status to themselves. In the political
affiliation task, participants were reminded that they had indicated their political affiliation on a slider
scale and were then allocated to one of the two conditions, where they were informed that the dictator
had either the same or different political affiliation to them (hereafter in-group and out-group condition).
We note here a slight discrepancy in the methods across these two tasks in that the participants were
explicitly told that their partner knew the political affiliation of both players in the political affiliation
task, whereas (due to an oversight) this explicit information was not provided in the social status task (in
the latter, participants knew that status of the partner but were not explicitly told that the partner also
knew the participant’s own status). In both tasks, once participants received the information about their
partners, the Dictator Game proceeded.
Dictators were endowed with $0.50 and could make a fair decision (send $0.25 to participant) or an
unfair decision (send $0.00 to participant). Participants saw the dictator’s decision and then rated on two
separate slider scales (0–100, initialized at 50) the extent to which they believed the dictator’s decision
was motivated by the dictator’s ‘desire to earn money’ (hereafter ‘self-interest’) and by the dictator’s
‘desire to reduce your bonus’ (hereafter ‘harmful intent’).
All participants answered three comprehension questions in each task. Participants that failed a
multiple-choice comprehension question were given a second attempt to answer correctly (using a free-
form answer to prevent guessing). Participants who still answered incorrectly (54/1242, 4.0%, in the
social status task and 50/1306, 3.8%, in the political affiliation task) could participate but we included
incomprehension as a variable in analyses.
Part C. Finally, participants were informed that they would interact in a task with a new partner but
that this time they were the dictator and their partner was the receiver. These decisions are not presented
or analysed: they were collected only so that we could truthfully inform participants that the dictator
decisions they saw had indeed been made by real players in the task.
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2.3. Pre-registered predictions
Predictions for each task were pre-registered separately (social status task: https://aspredicted.
org/kp3y4.pdf; political affiliation task: https://aspredicted.org/zd9sr.pdf). Analyses conform to the
predictions specified in these documents unless stated otherwise. One main deviation from all analyses
that was omitted from the pre-registered documents was to include ‘task comprehension’ as a variable
affecting participants’ ratings of the dictator’s intentions in both tasks. We include task comprehension
in all models, reporting the effects of this variable and also checking that results are qualitatively robust
to the exclusion of failed comprehenders.
2.4. Pre-existing paranoia predictions
First, we analysed the variables affecting the GPTS paranoia score. We predicted that social status
would be negatively associated with paranoia, and we pre-registered an exploratory analysis of whether
political affiliation had any effect on paranoia. Visual inspection of the relationship between social status
and paranoia revealed a bimodal distribution, with peaks at either extreme end of the status distribution.
To explore whether extreme social status values affected paranoia, we therefore ran an unregistered
analysis, where we included two binary dummy variables: ‘High Status’ (=1 if individual scored 9 or
10 on the social ladder; 0 otherwise) and ‘Low Status’ (=1 if individual scored 1 or 2 on the ladder; 0
otherwise). As paranoia scores were extremely right-skewed, we converted paranoia score into a nine-
level ordinal categorical variable [33], where each level of the factor had a minimum of 200 data points
(mean= 225). We note that we omitted to explicitly mention this transformation in the AsPredicted
documents, but we did state that we would explore the variables affecting variation in paranoia score
using a cumulative link model, which by definition implies an ordinal categorical response term. This
transformation was anticipated and pre-registered. The variables affecting pre-existing paranoia were
explored using a cumulative link model (clm) [36], which allows an ordinal categorical variable to be
specified as the dependent variable in a linear model.
2.5. Social status task predictions
We predicted that participants would make stronger harmful intent attributions when paired with higher
status partners and with unfair partners. We expected an independent positive effect of paranoia on
harmful intent attributions, and we expected paranoia to interact with (i) relative status and (ii) dictator
fairness to produce exaggerated harmful intent attributions (see electronic supplementary material for all
pre-registered predictions). Relative status was a three-level categorical variable describing the dictator’s
status relative to the participant’s. We recoded this into two binary dummy variables (‘Higher Status’ and
‘Lower Status’, respectively). The effects associated with the terms ‘Higher Status’ and ‘Lower Status’
can, therefore, be understood as relative to the base category of ‘Equal Status’.
We ran two clms, specifying (i) ‘harmful intent attribution’ and (ii) ‘self-interest attribution’ as five-
level ordinal categorical response terms. In each model, we included the following explanatory terms:
‘Age’, ‘Gender’, ‘Fairness’ (unfair/fair dictator), ‘Subjective Social Status’, ‘Paranoia’, ‘Comprehension’
(0, all questions correct; 1, at least one incorrect), ‘Higher Status’ (0, dictator not higher status; 1, dictator
higher status), ‘Lower Status’ (0, dictator not lower status; 1, dictator lower status). We also included all
pre-registered two-way and three-way interactions (see electronic supplementary material).
2.6. Political affiliation task predictions
We expected that participants would infer greater harmful intent when paired with an out-group
dictator, compared to when playing with an in-group dictator. As above, we also expected this effect
to be most pronounced for more paranoid subjects. As above, we ran two clms with the following
dependent variables: (i) harmful-intent attribution and (ii) self-interest attribution. We included the
following explanatory terms in both models: ‘Age’, ‘Fairness’, ‘Gender’, ‘Comprehension’, ‘Paranoia’,
‘Partner’ (in-group/out-group), ‘Political affiliation’ (subject’s own political affiliation). We also included
all pre-registered two-way and three-way interactions (see electronic supplementary material).
2.7. Statistical approach
Data were analysed using multi-model selection with model averaging (described in [27,37,38] and in
detail in the electronic supplementary material). Briefly, this approach involves specifying a global model
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Figure 1. Boxplot and whiskers of pre-existing paranoia scores as a function of subjective social status. Boxplots display themedian and
the interquartile range; whiskers are minimum and maximum values that are less than 1.5× interquartile range. Circles are outliers.
(with all predictors and interactions of hypothetical importance) and then comparing all derivative
submodels to determine which model, or set of models, is most consistent with the data. Models are
evaluated on the basis of an Akaike information criterion, corrected for small sample sizes (AICc), with
lower AICc values indicating a better model fit. The best model is the model with the lowest AICc value—
but models that are within two AICc units of the best model are also likely to be consistent with the data.
To account for the intrinsic uncertainty over which model is the true ‘best’ model, parameter estimates
and confidence intervals are therefore averaged over the full top model set (using package MuMIn [39]).
In our models, continuous input variables were standardized [40] and binary input variables were
centred, so estimates can be considered on the same scale. All data and code are available at https://
osf.io/bzhx3/.
3. Results
The mean subjective social status score was 5.01± 0.04 (range: 0–10). The mean political affiliation score
was 41.8± 0.67 (range: 0–100), indicating a slight liberal bias. Of the 2027 participants who provided a
political affiliation score, 104 (5.13%) gave a score of exactly 50, whereas 1142 (56.3%) scored less than
50 (i.e. liberal) and 781 (38.5%) scored greater than 50 (i.e. conservative). Paranoia scores ranged from 32
to 160 (mean: 54.8± 0.57), with 146 (7%) participants scoring above the clinical mean of 101.9 reported
in [29].
3.1. Variables affecting paranoia score
As predicted, social status had a negative effect on paranoia (estimate:−0.26, CI:−0.45,−0.06; figure 1a).
However, participants who reported themselves as being on either rung 9 or 10 of the social ladder
were also more paranoid than those below them (estimate: 1.31, CI: 0.67, 1.95; electronic supplementary
material, table S1), even after controlling for the generally negative effect of social status on pre-existing
paranoia (figure 1). Older participants were less paranoid (electronic supplementary material, table S1),
while political conservatives were slightly more paranoid than political liberals (figure 2). We did not
detect any meaningful effect of gender on paranoia (electronic supplementary material, table S1).
3.2. Harmful intent attribution
As predicted, harmful intent attributions were stronger when participants played against an unfair
partner, both in the social status task (table 1) and in the political affiliation task (table 2). Paranoia
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Figure 2. Boxplot and whiskers of pre-existing paranoia scores as a function of political affiliation (higher scores, increasing
conservatism).
positively predicted harmful intent attribution in both the social status task and the political affiliation
task (tables 1 and 2; figure 3); and participants attributed more harmful intent to higher status partners
(table 1; figure 4), and to out-group partners (table 2; figure 5), as predicted. Counter to our predictions,
however, there was no interaction between paranoia and either relative social status or group affiliation.
Thus, paranoid people did not show disproportionately strong harmful intent attributions when playing
against higher status, or out-group, dictators and instead showed harmful intent attributions that were
higher overall but nevertheless scaled up in response to social threat in the same way as for less paranoid
participants (tables 1 and 2).
3.3. Self-interest attribution
Participants attributed more self-interest to unfair partners in both tasks (electronic supplementary
material, tables S2 and S3), and we found no effect of paranoia on self-interest attribution in either
task (figure 3; electronic supplementary material, tables S2 and S3), as predicted. Political conservatism
positively affected the tendency to attribute self-interest to the partner (estimate: 0.26, CI: 0.02, 0.50), and
female participants also attributed more self-interest to partners in both tasks (electronic supplementary
material, tables S2 and S3). In the social status task, we found that participants attributed less self-interest
to unfair dictators when those dictators were perceived as being lower status than the participants
(electronic supplementary material, table S2). In the same task, there was also a positive effect of failing at
least one comprehension question on tendency to attribute self-interest to the partner, though all results
are qualitatively robust to the exclusion of failed comprehenders from analyses.
4. Discussion
Participants were exposed to social threat in two separate Dictator Game experiments. This task can
identify paranoid attributions because the motives underpinning unfair dictator decisions are ambiguous
and could feasibly reflect self-interest or (arguably less parsimoniously) malevolent intentions. Inferring
that dictators are motivated by harmful intentions is a reasonable proxy for live paranoid thinking.
Participants made stronger harmful intent attributions when playing against a higher status dictator,
and when playing against an out-group dictator, compared to when they played against equal or
lower status dictators, or against in-group dictators, respectively. Pre-existing paranoia strongly and
positively predicted harmful intent attribution in all conditions but, counter to our predictions, did
not result in exaggerated responses to social threat. Instead, paranoid people made stronger harmful
intent attributions overall, but their responses to social threat increased at the same rate as less paranoid
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Table 1. Variables affectingharmful intent attribution in the social status task.Harmful intentwas codedas afive-level ordinal categorical
variable and set as the response term in a clm [36]. Importance is the probability that the term in question is a component of the true
best model.
parameter estimate unconditional s.e. confidence interval relative importance
intercept 1|2 0.85 0.07 (0.71, 0.97)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 2|3 1.59 0.08 (1.44, 1.74)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 3|4 2.22 0.10 (2.03, 2.40)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 4|5 2.78 0.12 (2.55, 3.01)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dictator fair (1/0) −1.23 0.13 (−1.49,−0.98) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
male (1/0) −0.29 0.13 (−0.54,−0.03) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dictator higher status (1/0) 0.35 0.14 (0.08, 0.63) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
failed comprehension (1/0) 1.64 0.26 (1.14, 2.15) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
paranoia 0.42 0.12 (0.18, 0.66) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
subjective social status 0.10 0.13 (−0.15, 0.36) 0.55
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
fairness× higher status −0.16 0.25 (−0.66, 0.33) 0.45
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
higher status× paranoia −0.06 0.16 (−0.36, 0.25) 0.24
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dictator lower status (1/0) 0.03 0.09 (−0.15, 0.20) 0.21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
age 0.01 0.05 (−0.09, 0.11) 0.14
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2. Variables affecting harmful intent attribution in the political ideology task. Harmful intent was coded as a five-level ordinal
categorical variable and set as the response term in a clm [36]. Political affiliation refers to the subject’s political affiliation (0–100, liberal–
conservative).
parameter estimate unconditional s.e. confidence interval relative importance
intercept 1|2 −0.62 0.06 (0.50, 0.74)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 2|3 1.52 0.07 (1.37, 1.67)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 3|4 2.09 0.09 (1.92, 2.27)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
intercept 4|5 2.91 0.12 (2.68, 3.14)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in-group partner (1/0) −0.47 0.12 (−0.70,−0.24) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
dictator fair (1/0) −1.18 0.12 (−1.42,−0.95) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
male (1/0) −0.28 0.12 (−0.52,−0.05) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
failed comprehension (1/0) 0.77 0.28 (0.21, 1.32) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
paranoia 0.54 0.11 (0.31, 0.76) 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
political affiliation 0.09 0.12 (−0.15, 0.33) 0.64
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in-group partner× paranoia 0.21 0.24 (−0.27, 0.68) 0.52
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in-group partner× dictator fair× paranoia −0.12 0.31 (−0.73, 0.48) 0.25
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
participants. This suggests that paranoia reflects a lower threshold for detecting social threat rather
than an exaggerated responsivity to it. Furthermore, contextual social threat can induce live paranoid
attributions, even in people who do not have high levels of pre-existing paranoia.
These results pertain to epidemiological studies where ethnic minority status is a risk factor for
paranoia but increased density of same-ethnicity individuals can protect against this effect [10]. Ethnicity
is perceived as one of the most salient markers of group affiliation and this protective ‘ethnic-density’
effect may be partly driven by lowered concerns about negative interactions with out-groups. We
tested a key hypothesis deriving from these results: beliefs about perceived out-group members’ hostile
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Figure 3. Meanharmful intent and self-interest attributionsmade by participants in the (a) social status and (b) political affiliation tasks,
respectively.Means and standard errors are generated from rawdata. For the ease of visualization, paranoiawas converted to a nine-level
categorical variable, though note that paranoia was included as a continuous term in the models.
intentions mediate paranoid attributions. Here, we selected political affiliation as a marker of group
identity precisely because it tends to be polarizing—and our data support the hypothesis. Ideally, future
studies would challenge this hypothesis with other salient group affiliations.
Our study also raises questions about whether paranoia depends on qualitatively different social
reasoning or instead reflects typical social information processing with a lower threshold for social
threat detection. Some studies have reported a ‘dose effect’ of paranoia on cognitive biases (e.g. [43,44]),
suggesting that harmful intent attributions should become increasingly out of proportion as pre-existing
paranoia increases. However, our data imply that, in the face of social threat, the harmful intent
attributions made by highly paranoid people scale in a similar way to those made by non-paranoid
people. This implies that the key processes behind chronically high paranoia might be those that maintain
high levels of social threat awareness rather than those that impair the interpretation of the magnitude of
social risk. Indeed, maintaining factors, such as worry, negative self-beliefs, anomalous experiences and
poor sleep, have been identified as key in previous paranoia research [45].
As expected, low subjective social status was a positive predictor of pre-existing paranoia. However,
paranoid ideation was also higher among individuals who self-reported being at the top end of the
social ladder. Bearing in mind that this analysis was unplanned and should therefore ideally be replicated
before drawing firm conclusions, this result raises several possibilities. The first is that perceiving oneself
as different, rather than being low status, is what promotes paranoid thinking. The second is that
individuals at the extremes of the social status distribution are more likely to be fearful of danger from
others. Those at the top of the hierarchy might be targeted by those below them, and those at the bottom
fear those who might attempt to coerce or exploit them [46]. Existing studies suggest that increased threat
perception is associated with low rather than high social status [47], though studies of non-human species
have shown that social dominance can be linked to elevated stress [48] and that this is most likely when
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Figure 4. Boxplots of (a) self-interest attributions and (b) harmful intent attributions (generated from raw data) made for the dictator
as a function of the dictator’s relative social status. Raw data displayed as open circles, with a horizontal jitter function of 0.1 applied to
ease visualization. Plot produced using R packages ggplot2 [41] and ggpubr [42].
dominance hierarchies are unstable (see also [49]). Research on paranoia has not explored the individuals
at society’s highest social ranks, meaning that a potential ‘paranoia of the elite’ has yet to be investigated.
Political conservatism had a small positive effect on pre-existing paranoia. This supports previous
research indicating that political conservatism might stem from increased threat-sensitivity [50], being
associated, for example, with increased sensitivity to images of threatening faces [51].
We also replicated key results from Raihani & Bell [26], namely that pre-existing paranoia positively
predicts harmful intent attributions but not attributions of self-interest in the Dictator Game; and also
that pre-existing paranoia does not interact with dictator fairness to increase harmful intent attributions.
Moreover, in the current study and previously, we found that participants made stronger harmful intent
attributions towards selfish (compared to fair) dictators, providing a strong basis for the conclusions of
both studies.
4.1. Limitations
The parameters of the social interaction were relatively constrained: information about group affiliation
and social status was restricted to a simple declaration by the experimenters. Although this declaration
reliably produced group and rank-related changes in harmful intent attributions, the context is
considerably more limited than it would be in face-to-face interactions.
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Figure 5. Boxplots of (a) self-interest attributions and (b) harmful intent attributions (generated from raw data) made for dictators who
either had similar or different political affiliation to the participant. Plot produced with ggplot2 [41] and ggpubr [42].
Amazon Mechanical Turk offers access to a diverse sample of participants that is more representative
of the US general population than typical samples comprised of undergraduates [52], and produces
results that are internally consistent (e.g. [26]) and equivalent to those obtained under laboratory
conditions [52] or using benchmark national samples (e.g. [53]). Nevertheless, MTurk samples have
reduced ethnic diversity than the general population [54], and we cannot generalize these findings from
US respondents to other cultures. In terms of clinically relevant selection biases, MTurk participants
report higher levels of social anxiety, although they are not more likely to report emotional dysregulation
at clinically relevant levels than other general population samples [55].
In terms of clinical implications, it is unclear to what extent these results will generalize to patients
with paranoid delusions. Independent studies have shown full taxometric continuity between subclinical
and clinical paranoia [2,3], suggesting that it is reasonable to expect generalizability across the spectrum
of severity. We do not know whether people with frank paranoid delusions participated in this study,
but we suggest it is likely that at least some of the high paranoia sample may have beliefs that would
be diagnosed as delusional. From the total sample, 7% had GPTS scores above the clinical mean of
patients with paranoid delusions reported by Green et al. [29]. Furthermore, schizophrenia and paranoid
delusions do not seem to be an impediment to Internet use [56,57]. However, it is also likely that there
are selection biases that affect to what extent the clinical population participate in these online studies
and these may have affected the results—we assume to under-represent the most severely affected here.
To conclude, our data suggest that contextual social threat increases live paranoid attributions during
social interactions and that paranoia across the full spectrum could represent a lowered threshold for
detecting social threat. By contrast, our data offer little support for the idea that paranoia involves a
dysregulated reaction to the magnitude of social threat, indicating that paranoia represents an altered
baseline for social threat perception in the context of intact social threat responsivity.
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